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On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games by Guo, Qingyu; Gan, Jiarui; Fang, Fei; Tran-Thanh, Long; Tambe, Milind; An, Bo is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

What is On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games about?

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid; it is possible that the defender cannot induce the desired outcome. As a result, many results claimed in the literature may be overly optimistic. To remedy, we first formally define the utility guarantee of a defender strategy and provide examples to show that the utility of SSE can be higher than its utility guarantee. Second, inspired by the analysis of leader's payoff by Von Stengel and Zamir (2004), we provide the solution concept called the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which owns the highest utility guarantee and always exists. Third, we show the conditions when ISE coincides with SSE and the fact that in general case, SSE can be extremely worse with

Author

Guo, Qingyu; Gan, Jiarui; Fang, Fei; Tran-Thanh, Long; Tambe, Milind; An, Bo

Published

2018

Language

EN