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ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution by Schwarz, Michael; Schilling, Robert; Kargl, Florian; Lipp, Moritz; Canella, Claudio; Gruss, Daniel is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

What is ConTExT: Leakage-Free Transient Execution about?

Out-of-order execution and speculative execution are among the biggest contributors to performance and efficiency of modern processors. However, they are inconsiderate, leaking secret data during the transient execution of instructions. Many solutions have been proposed against transient execution attacks. However, they do not eliminate the leakage entirely or introduce unacceptable performance penalties. In this paper, we propose ConTExT, a Considerate Transient Execution Technique. The basic idea of ConTExT is that secrets can enter registers, but not transiently leave them. ConTExT transforms Spectre from a problem that cannot be solved purely in software [53], to a problem that is not easy to solve, but solvable in software. For this, ConTExT requires minimal modifications of applications, compilers, operating systems, and the hardware. ConTExT offers full protection for secrets in memory and secrets in registers. We evaluate the security and performance of ConTExT. With its principled approach it inherently mitigates the recently found microarchitectural data sampling attacks on small processor buffers. Even when over-approximating, we observe no performance overhead for unpro

Author

Schwarz, Michael; Schilling, Robert; Kargl, Florian; Lipp, Moritz; Canella, Claudio; Gruss, Daniel

Published

2019

Language

EN