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Can I read Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs on EtoBox?
Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs by Lanny Arvan; Luı́s Cabral; Vasco Santos is a Economics, Econometrics and Finance article available to read on EtoBox.
What is Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs about?
We generalize Farrell's (1987) idea of coordination by means of cheap talk. We show that if cheap talk is meaningful (in the sense that babbling equilibria are ruled out) and if there is room for cooperation (namely if there exists at least one pure-strategy equilibrium Pareto superior to the default equilibrium), then cheap talk must increase the equilibrium expected payoff relative to the play of the game without preplay communication. The result is limited to proper equilibria of the communication game and to games with two players. It is shown that
Who reads Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs?
It is typically read by researchers, students, and practitioners in Economics, Econometrics and Finance.
- Author
- Lanny Arvan; Luı́s Cabral; Vasco Santos
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science; Elsevier ; Elsevier BV (ISSN 0165-4896)
- Published
- 1999
- Language
- EN
- Field
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Social Sciences)