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Can I read Sequential Bargaining with Common Values on EtoBox?
Sequential Bargaining with Common Values by Paul Schweinzer is a Economics, Econometrics and Finance article available to read on EtoBox.
What is Sequential Bargaining with Common Values about?
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this game which is unique if offers are required to be strictly increasing. Equilibrium agreement is reached gradually and non-deterministically. The better informed player obtains a rent.
Who reads Sequential Bargaining with Common Values?
It is typically read by researchers, students, and practitioners in Economics, Econometrics and Finance.
- Author
- Paul Schweinzer
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science; Elsevier ; Elsevier BV (ISSN 0304-4068)
- Published
- 2010
- Language
- EN
- Field
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Social Sciences)