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Can I read Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity on EtoBox?
Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity by Aviad Rubinstein; S. Matthew Weinberg is a Decision Sciences article available to read on EtoBox.
What is Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity about?
We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from some distribution D . We show that if D is a distribution over subadditive valuations with independent items, then the better of pricing each item separately or pricing only the grand bundle achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism. This includes buyers who are k -demand, additive up to a matroid constraint, or additive up to constraints of any downward-closed set system (and whose values for the individual items are sampled independently), as well as buyers who are fractionally subadditive with item multipliers drawn independently. Our proof makes use of the core-tail decomposition framework developed in prior work showing similar results for the significantly simpler class of additive buyers. In the second part of the article, we develop a connection between approximately optimal simple mechanisms and approximate revenue monotonicity with respect to buyers’ valuations. Revenue non-monotonicity is the phenomenon that sometimes strictly increasing buyers’ values for ev
Who reads Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity?
It is typically read by researchers, students, and practitioners in Decision Sciences.
- Author
- Aviad Rubinstein; S. Matthew Weinberg
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2018
- Language
- EN
- Field
- Decision Sciences (Social Sciences)