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Can I read Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate on EtoBox?
Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate by Christopher W. Crowe is a nonfiction available to read on EtoBox.
What is Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate about?
Annotation A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. the data confirm this
Who reads Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate?
It is typically read by self-directed learners exploring a subject in depth.
Common subject areas: history, science, philosophy, social sciences.
- Author
- Christopher W. Crowe
- Publisher
- International Monetary Fund
- Published
- 2006
- Language
- EN
- ISBN
- 9781462362912
- Category
- nonfiction
- Subjects
- Finance, Business
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