Can I read Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol on EtoBox?

Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol by Neuder, Michael; Moroz, Daniel J.; Rao, Rithvik; Parkes, David C. is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

What is Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol about?

Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols give rise to complex modeling challenges. We analyze the recently-updated Tezos Proof-of-Stake protocol and demonstrate that, under certain conditions, rational participants are incentivized to behave dishonestly. In doing so, we provide a theoretical analysis of the feasibility and profitability of a block stealing attack that we call selfish endorsing, a concrete instance of an attack previously only theoretically considered. We propose and analyze a simple change to the Tezos protocol which significantly reduces the (already small) profitability of this dishonest behavior, and introduce a new delay and reward scheme that is provably secure against length-1 and length-2 selfish endorsing attacks. Our framework provides a template for analyzing other Proof-of-Stake implementations for selfish behavior.

Author

Neuder, Michael; Moroz, Daniel J.; Rao, Rithvik; Parkes, David C.

Published

2019

Language

EN