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Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats When Bidders Are Asymmetric by Olivier Armantier; Erwann SbaÏ is a Economics, Econometrics and Finance article available to read on EtoBox.
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## Abstract The structural parameters of a share‐auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty, are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. A counter‐factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform‐price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auctions' participants. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Who reads Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats When Bidders Are Asymmetric?
It is typically read by researchers, students, and practitioners in Economics, Econometrics and Finance.
- Author
- Olivier Armantier; Erwann SbaÏ
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons; Wiley (John Wiley & Sons); John Wiley & Sons Inc.; Wiley (ISSN 0883-7252)
- Published
- 2006
- Language
- EN
- Field
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (Social Sciences)