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Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis by Michael Backes; Peeter Laud is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

What is Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis about?

We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability/UC which entails that secrecy properties proven by our tool are automatically guaranteed to hold for secure cryptographic implementations of the analyzed protocol, with respect to the more fine-grained cryptographic secrecy definitions and adversary models.Our tool is capable of reasoning about a comprehensive language for expressing protocols, in particular handling symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, and it produces proofs for an unbounded number of sessions in the presence of an active adversary. We have implemented the tool and applied it to a number of common protocols from the literature.

Author

Michael Backes; Peeter Laud

Publisher

ACM

Published

2006

Language

PL