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Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '06 - Resource selection games with unknown number of players by Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tennenholtz, Moshe is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

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In the context of pre-Bayesian games we analyze resource selection games with unknown number of players. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in a game with strictly increasing linear cost functions every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. In order to perform the analysis we define safety-level equilibrium for pre-Bayesian games, and prove that it exists in a compact-continuous-concave setup; in particular it exists in a finite setup.

Author

Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tennenholtz, Moshe

Publisher

ACM Press

Published

2006

Language

EN