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Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods by Yonatan Aumann; Yair Dombb; Avinatan Hassidim is a Decision Sciences article available to read on EtoBox.

What is Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods about?

We consider the problem of auctioning time - a one-dimensional continuously-divisible heterogeneous good - among multiple agents. Applications include auctioning time for using a shared device, auctioning TV commercial slots, and more. Different agents may have different valuations for the different possible intervals; the goal is to maximize the aggregate utility. Agents are self-interested and may misrepresent their true valuation functions if this benefits them. Thus, we seek auctions that are truthful . Considering the case that each agent may obtain a single interval, the challenge is twofold, as we need to determine both where to slice the interval, and who gets what slice. We consider two settings: discrete and continuous. In the discrete setting, we are given a sequence of m indivisible elements ( e 1 , ..., e m ), and the auction must allocate each agent a consecutive subsequence of the elements. In the continuous setting, we are given a continuous, infinitely divisible interval, and the auction must allocate each agent a subinterval. The agents’ valuations are nonatomic measures on the interval. We show that, for both settings, the associated computational problem is NP-c

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Author

Yonatan Aumann; Yair Dombb; Avinatan Hassidim

Publisher

ACM

Published

2016

Language

EN

Field

Decision Sciences (Social Sciences)