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Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock by Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

What is Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn Meet Tullock about?

This paper examines the optimal organizational rules that govern the process of dividing a fixed surplus. The process is modeled as a sequential multilateral bargaining game with costly recognition. The designer sets the voting rule -- i.e., the minimum number of votes required to approve a proposal -- and the mechanism for proposer recognition, which is modeled as a biased generalized lottery contest. We show that for diverse design objectives, the optimum can be achieved by a dictatorial voting rule, which simplifies the game into a standard biased contest model.

Author

Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan

Published

2024

Language

EN