Can I read Battlefield Transfers in Coalitional Blotto Games on EtoBox?

Battlefield Transfers in Coalitional Blotto Games by Shah, Vade; Marden, Jason R. is a scholarly article available to read on EtoBox.

What is Battlefield Transfers in Coalitional Blotto Games about?

In competitive resource allocation environments, agents often choose to form alliances; however, for some agents, doing so may not always be beneficial. Is there a method of forming alliances that always reward each of their members? We study this question using the framework of the coalitional Blotto game, in which two players compete against a common adversary by allocating their budgeted resources across disjoint sets of valued battlefields. On any given battlefield, the agent that allocates a greater amount of resources wins the corresponding battlefield value. Existing work has shown the surprising result that in certain game instances, if one player donates a portion of their budget to the other player, then both players win larger amounts in their separate competitions against the adversary. However, this transfer-based method of alliance formation is not always mutually beneficial, which motivates the search for alternate strategies. In this vein, we study a new method of alliance formation referred to as a joint transfer, whereby players publicly transfer battlefields and budgets between one another before they engage in their separate competitions against the adversary. W

Author

Shah, Vade; Marden, Jason R.

Published

2023

Language

EN